Globalization and Unrest on Both Sides of Mediterranean by Lagrange, Hugues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND UNREST  
ON  BOTH SIDES OF MEDITERRANEAN 
 
 
Hugues Lagrange 
 
 
  Notes & Documents  
    n° 2015-02 Mars 2015 
 
 
 
Résumé : 
 
Pendant le printemps 2011, d’importantes manifestations ont eu lieu dans plusieurs pays du Moyen 
Orient et d’Afrique du Nord (MENA). Parallèlement,  des manifestations de masse se sont déroulées au sud de 
l’Europe – Espagne, Grèce, Portugal –, tandis que les pays du nord et l’est de l’Europe n’ont pas connu de 
telles manifestations.  
Est-ce que l’on trouve des deux côtés de la Méditerranée, les mêmes aspirations ou les mêmes 
frustrations ? Sans prétendre démêler l’écheveau complexe des motivations qui sous-tendent ces actions, on se 
propose d’analyser le contexte socio-économique dans lequel elles ont émergé en s’appuyant sur des données 
fournies par le BIT, les rapports de l’UNESCO (ESCWA), les statistiques de la Banque Mondiale et la base de 
données sur l’éducation Baro-Lee.  
Un contexte favorable à des manifestations de masse résulte, au nord comme au sud de la 
méditerranée, de la conjonction d’un taux de chômage élevé des jeunes les plus éduqués et de l’affaiblissement 
de la légitimité des gouvernants. 
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Abstract:  
 
In the spring of 2011, large scale public demonstrations took place in several countries across the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). At the same time, civil unrest caused massive demonstrations in European 
countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In this same period, northern and eastern European countries 
did not experience such massive and widespread social protests.  
Do both sides of the Mediterranean share the same mindset? Are common challenges and aspirations 
molding these protests? Without any desire to delineate the complex thread of motivations underlying these 
demonstrations and protests, we will analyze their socio-economic context using data from ILO reports, 
UNESCO-ESCWA reports, World Bank statistics and the Barro-Lee database.  
We will show that high unemployment rates among young educated people coincided with the weakening 
of legitimacy of national governments. 
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In the spring of 2011, large scale public demonstrations took place in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Syria, Yemen, and, to a lesser extent, other countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). The demonstrations involved highly educated young men and women, frequently 
unemployed and with few prospects for a better life, fighting for democracy, human rights 
and the end of authoritarian states. These young people were the initiators of major political 
change. Protests south of the Mediterranean seem to have resulted in, or at least had 
similarities with protests on the northern side of the sea. During late spring 2011, unrest 
spread, with massive demonstrations took place in Southern Europe, including Spain, 
Greece and Portugal. There were massive peaceful demonstrations (except for several 
meetings in Athens’ Syntagma square). 
The demonstrations took place almost simultaneously in cultural contexts that were 
widely different. In many countries, young educated people of both sexes were at the 
forefront of large peaceful demonstrations. Often triggered by an emotional event in MENA 
countries, the demonstrations were promoted through the intensive and smart utilization of 
social networks (Facebook, Twitter, blogs) and the unconventional use of TV programs (talk 
shows, cartoons). Except in Syria and Libya, where civil wars broke out, the youth-initiated 
demonstrations brought together a wide range of people of all ages and walks of life, in the 
name of direct democracy. Under the motto Democracia real ya! (True democracy now!), 
meetings took place round the clock in Madrid’s Plaza del Sol, Athens’s Syntagma square, 
and Cairo’s Tahrir square, in addition to many other places throughout MENA countries. 
These protests unfolded outside the confines of the established classical political parties and 
religious offshoots. Later (The Muslim Brotherhood joined the civil movement in Egypt and 
Tunisia). Except in Syria, the youth participating in these uprisings spoke of liberty, reform 
and social justice with little reference to the ethno-religious politics that had animated 
previous opposition movements. Within a historical perspective, “the secular nature of recent 
movements is not a surprise, but their distance from xenophobic nationalism and statist 
‘socialism,’ in favor of common liberties, is a novelty.”1 Did both sides of the Mediterranean 
that went beyond a common idiom and forms of transnational dialogue? Were common 
challenges and common aspirations shaping the protests?  
Widespread use of new forms of media communication was essential on both sides of 
the Mediterranean. One of the most surprising changes concerning the new technologies is 
that information is often diffused quicker and with greater consequences in countries where 
1 S. Subside, 2011. Since the aim of the movement in Egypt and Tunisia is radical constitutional change and 
basic aspects of the social order are at stake the term revolution is appropriate. 
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the previous technologies (landline telephones and electricity) are underdeveloped. The 
digital equipment (mobile phone and Internet access) gap between the two sides of the 
Mediterranean is narrow, and mobile phone subscription are sometimes even higher in 
MENA countries (namely in the Gulf states) than in Europe. Still, regarding IT utilization, 
countries affected by “Arab Springs” present widely different situations: in 2010, Tunisia and 
Egypt were among the most “tech-savvy civil societies,” while Yemen and Libya were among 
the least (Hussain and Howard, 2013). The widespread diffusion of information technology 
was counterbalanced by widespread state instituted censorship, particularly in Iran, Egypt, 
Algeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. On the whole, there are no obvious correlations between 
access to IT and the geography of the Arab Springs (see Figure a1 in the Appendix 
regarding the diffusion of mobile and Internet technologies and Figure 2 for places of unrest). 
Lisa Anderson, the President of the American University in Cairo, underlined that, “The 
important story about the 2011 Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is not how the 
globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters’ aspirations. Nor is it 
about how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics. Instead, the critical issue is 
how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts.”2 
Though the patterns of the protests varied widely, there were common social dynamics. The 
massive demonstrations of 2011 followed years of growing unrest south of the 
Mediterranean. During the early 1990s in many MENA countries, human rights activists were 
isolated3 and the ruling elite, sustained by the income from oil and tourism, were able to 
suppress protest by using dictatorial means and making appeals to Arab pride and 
resentment against the West. The ability faded during the first decade of the 21st century.  
In Algeria, recurring Berber strife took place between 1988 and 2002; and in 2002 large 
Berber demonstrations to defend their linguistic and cultural rights were silenced. Labor 
unions were a crucial force in protests against the regime’s privatization policies and the poor 
living standards of the working class, which culminated in 2003 and 2008. The Front 
Islamique du Salut’s (FIS) 1992 defeat fostered years of increased fragmentation of civil 
society and prevented efforts to maintain a secular path devoid of democracy. Morocco had 
hundreds of protests involving labor unions, youth activists, and professionals demonstrating 
against unemployment, high prices, and poor living standards. Uprisings in Tunisia also 
occurred during the 2000s, with major demonstrations erupting in 2008 against a mining 
2 Anderson, 2011, stated that, “The demonstrations in Tunisia spiraled toward the capital from the neglected rural 
areas, finding common cause with a once powerful but much repressed labor movement. In Egypt, by contrast, 
urbane and cosmopolitan young people in the major cities organized the uprisings. Meanwhile, in Libya, ragtag 
bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces ignited the protests, revealing the tribal and regional cleavages 
that have beset the country for decades.” 
3 Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 32, 2000, 71-95. 
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company over issues of employee workplace standards. In Egypt, the Kifaya (Enough!) 
which movement emerged in 2004, called for an overhaul of the Mubarak regime; initially it 
failed to develop a mass following. Between 2004 and 2007, Egypt experienced almost a 
thousand demonstrations. In the Gulf countries, mainly Kuwait and Bahrain, demonstrations 
and protests were primarily political in nature and relied heavily on clan alignments; only in 
2011 did students play a more active role.4 Protests in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco were 
mostly socio-economic in nature and apparently lacked any political dimensions. These 
protests were nevertheless essential to demonstrating the salience of economic concerns to 
the working poor, as well as to the middle class and professionals. South of the 
Mediterranean, the political situation began to alter in the mid-2000s with the retreat of the 
American military from Iraq. A historical cycle was coming to an end. Emotional events, such 
as the death of Bouazizi (Tunisia), Khaled Said (Egypt) and the death of Dehra 
demonstrators in Syria, crystallized unrest in large portions of the population.   
The 2011 protests in southern European countries were not preceded by movements 
analogous to those in MENA countries. During the early 2000s, in several northern European 
countries—the UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium—violent riots were recurrent 
involving large numbers of young immigrants from North Africa, and, in the UK, from the 
West Indies and Central Asia. With the exception of August 2011 events in the UK involving 
mostly youth from the West Indies; those from Northern and Eastern Europe did not take to 
the streets in 2011. In contrast to Southern European countries, Northern and Eastern 
European countries did not experience massive social protests by young educated people or 
those living in poor neighborhoods. Moreover, in spite of strong community ties, when 
protests and demonstrations occurred in the Maghreb and the Middle East in 2011, young 
immigrants from poor districts in Europe remained conspicuously silent.5 As such this double 
non-participation among northern minority and mainstream youths is meaningful.  
Beyond the simultaneity of the occurrence of protests north and south of the 
Mediterranean and the use of shared idioms, the main reason to not consider each country 
as a unique entity is because the actors were mostly young educated people. This reason 
might seem trivial because youngsters often spearhead revolt and revolutionary processes, 
however, it has been three decades since they were at the forefront of general 
4 N. Sika, The Arab Uprisings and The Rise of Secularism, March 17, 2011, http://themoornextdoor.com 
5 Muslim NGOs like UOIF in France remained silent. There have been no significant spontaneous solidarity 
movements among the youth from North Africa and the Middle East. Neither the well-educated nor the under-
achieving youth of North-African ancestry in Europe have overtly manifested their sympathy, with the exception of 
Turkish and Black youths who are not closely tied to the Middle East and North Africa revolutionary processes. 
3/28 
                                                        
OSC – Notes & Documents N° 2015-02 
Hugues Lagrange – Globalization and unrest on both sides of Mediterranean. 
demonstrations in Europe, and very little demonstrations involving young educated people in 
MENA countries before the 2000s.  
A tentative socio-demographic framework of analysis  
If it is difficult to create a comprehensive framework for what happened in MENA 
countries; it is even more daring to try to grasp in the same framework the events on both 
sides of the Mediterranean. Many publications about the Arab Spring have comprehensively 
analyzed countries and their political stonewalling. Youth protests in countries south of the 
Mediterranean have been discussed often; much less is written on youth protests north of the 
sea, while comparisons of youth unrest and demonstrations on both sides are even rarer. It 
is difficult to articulate interpretations because, in spite of globalization, the two regions are 
divided by huge gaps in living standards and political functioning. What occurred on both 
sides of the Mediterranean during the spring of 2011 is certainly a globalized but still 
heterogeneous series of events. Unrest condenses the changes made at different levels, and 
several aspects came into play that each have their own“mode d’existence” (Latour, 2013).  
I am interested here in the motivational aspects of the movements and not their 
immediate or long-term consequences. I will limit my review to point out the commonalities 
and the main elements of distinction brought to light by the “2011 springs.” Is there a political 
narrative that bridges this hybridism or at least allows us to discuss the processes that 
resulted in upheavals? 
To build a framework of analysis, at least one scenario, and hopefully several variants, 
must be used to describe what happened, taking into account long-term changes at different 
levels of the societies on each side of the Mediterranean during the last several decades. 
Without any desire to delineate the complex thread of motivations underlying these 
demonstrations and protests, I propose the hypothesis that the role played by the educated 
youth in MENA countries lacking democratic procedures could, by contrast, shed light on 
implications of the youth in the European context where civil liberties and regular democratic 
processes have—sometime only recently—been granted. These mobilizations reveal 
common challenges brought on by the globalization process and synchronized by the 2008 
financial crisis and its consequences. My argument is that: 1) if two dimensions—freedom 
and distributive justice—have different weight north and south of the Mediterranean, these 
massive demonstrations have revealed convergent stakes, at least among educated youth 
on both sides; 2) in Northern European countries, there is a strict separation between two 
fractions of the youth which hampered unification and thus large-scale protests, and that 
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such a split does not exist in Southern European countries; 3) in MENA countries, the youth’s 
ability to unite other age segments, at least in silent support, has been a key factor in 
spreading the mobilization and inhibiting, to a certain extent the capacity of governments to 
resort to violent repression.6   
To understand the dynamics of protest in the second section I will consider some of the 
more general protest conditions.7 Especially in countries south of the Mediterranean, where 
demonstrations are often harshly repressed, it is necessary to consider the legitimacy of the 
protests, or conversely, the breach in the legitimacy of the power in place. I will start by 
assembling elements of comparison of the youth situation and their life prospects. The ILO 
databases provide a systematic account of more than 150 countries of the labor force, the 
activity rate and unemployment rates according to sex, age and education levels. Obviously 
the quality of the data and the temporal scope varies. For MENA countries, the UNESCO-
ESCWA reports provide some elements of comparison regarding the unemployment of 
people with basic and tertiary education from 2000 to 2010. To take into account the 
evolution of education, I have used the Barro-Lee dataset on education, which is a 
systematic attempt to describe with homogeneous indicators education levels since mid-
twentieth century across the majority of countries in the world.8 World fertility surveys are 
easily accessible and show the relative importance of age groups. 
Youth demography 
Let us look at the basic factors that are likely to account for the dynamics observed on 
both sides of the Mediterranean. Which countries were involved? Why these countries and 
not others? Why did the protests take place in the early 2010s? 
The first argument given to explain the wave of youth protests in the MENA region is 
the demographic bulge of youth coming of age. During the last decades of the 20th century, 
while the proportions of youth of working age differed widely on both sides of the sea, the 
socio-demographic gap between countries north and south of the Mediterranean was 
strongly narrowed through a combination of reduced fertility rates and increased education 
levels in MENA countries. This provided the basis for a partial social convergence with 
6 In Sanaa, Yemen in 2011, the repression was particularly harsh.  
7 Even after several attempts, I cannot see the usefulness in putting together elements located on different levels 
into a statistical model, even with the appropriate weights. 
8 The benchmark figures on school attainment (599 census/survey observations) are collected from 
census/survey information, as compiled by UNESCO, Eurostat, and other sources. The census/survey figures 
report the distribution of educational attainment in the over-15 population by sex and by five-year age segment, 
for most cases, in six categories: no formal education, incomplete primary, complete primary, lower secondary, 
upper secondary, and tertiary. 
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Europe. We witness on one hand, divergences in Europe in response to globalization, on the 
other, a narrowing gap between MENA and Southern European countries. In most MENA 
countries, fertility rates were fairly high during the mid-1960s, with women having an average 
of seven children, except for Lebanon where the rate was around 5.5. Forty years later, the 
fertility rates in 2005 varied between 3.0 and 3.5 in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the 
U.A.E., and were below 2.5 in Libya, Maghreb and Lebanon. (Yemen and Mauritania are 
excluded since they have not experienced a demographic transition). Since the mid-1970s, 
most MENA countries have experienced a rapid decline in fertility rates, which led to rates 
not so conspicuously different on both sides of the Mediterranean in the early 2000s.  
Figure 1: Fertility rates in select Middle East countries and Maghreb: 1965–2005 
 
Source: World Fertility Survey and US Census Bureau, 2008. 
Despite these convergences, because of the lag effects of fertility rates on youth 
population, demographic proportions of young people diverged greatly from one side of the 
Mediterranean to the other in the 2000s. In MENA countries, numerous cohorts born before 
the 1980s came of age in the 2000s; the youth bulge is a smooth curve reaching its apex 
approximately around 2005. Because of different speed of demographic transition, the 
variation of the share of youth among the working age population is large and the differences 
in this respect between “young” countries and “older” ones could have been a discriminating 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1965
2005
6/28 
OSC – Notes & Documents N° 2015-02 
Hugues Lagrange – Globalization and unrest on both sides of Mediterranean. 
factor of protest. Were these demographic differences precisely associated with waves of 
protest? The Arab Springs demographically affected young countries (five of the youngest 
countries experienced large movements in 2011), most of which, but not all, accomplished 
their modern demographic transition between 1980 and 1990. Countries where the number 
of 15–24 year-olds was over 25%, like Jordan and Morocco, experienced some 
demonstrations, but to a far lesser extent than Tunisia or Egypt. Meanwhile, “young 
societies,” such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia, remained quiet despite their youth bulge. 
Among the Gulf States, only Bahrain participated in the protest events. Thus while population 
growth may help identify countries where protests are most likely to occur, it is far from 
conclusive.  
Figure 2: Distribution of countries according to % of youth (15–24) in the working age population in 
European and MENA countries.  
Those countries affected by massive protests and demonstrations are in bold letters. 
 
Source: UN World Fertility Surveys compiled by ILO. 
The italicized countries were not as involved as those in bold. However, they could be 
considered as having experienced demonstrations and protest to a certain extent. If, for 
MENA countries, youth demography is insufficient to characterize the geography of protests, 
for Europe it is completely misleading. In Europe, the youth bulge occurred a long time ago, 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After that time, demographic rates evolved without 
showing any north-south gradient: some of the fertility rates in Southern Europe at the time 
were among the lowest. And yet in the spring 2011, unrest spread mostly in the Southern 
European countries of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Demonstrations have arisen in countries 
where young people are even a smaller fraction of the working age population than in 
Northern and Eastern European countries. In addition, the variation of the percentage of 
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youth is very narrow in Europe. In Italy, where the 15-24 year old segment is small, no 
massive demonstrations took place (but Berlusconi’s ejection and the Five Star protests do 
have some of the characteristics seen in other southern countries).9 If a common ground 
between these protests on both sides of the sea exists, it is not defined by the youth 
demography; thus, to understand the roots and meaning of the protest, other aspects must 
be taken into account.  
Socio-economic context of protests 
One argument given to explain protests in MENA countries is that youth perspective in 
terms of employment was bleak; this argument has been given also in Europe (see ILO 
reports, Word Bank Statistics, UNESCO statistical committee, Mesiano 2012, Ajbilou and 
Boudirba 2011, Campante and Chor, 2012). In MENA countries between 2000 and 2011, 
while the youth unemployment rate hovered around 25%, which was much more than that in 
Europe, there was no clear trend. In Algeria, despite the wealth of oil resources and major 
improvements in health and education over the past few decades, the social and economic 
systems have not evolved in a way that effectively meets the changing needs of the country’s 
rapidly growing young population. In Egypt and Tunisia, both of which are deprived of oil, 
population growth has exceeded job growth, with the exception of jobs in the tourism industry 
for the new educated class. Considering the level of unemployment, MENA countries were 
good candidates for unrest, but 2010 and 2011 were not the precise moments indicated by 
unemployment figures. Conversely, in Europe, changes in youth unemployment levels in 
2009–2010 could have triggered the protests. At least when considering aggregated data, 
unemployment soared during the 2000s, climbing from 12% to 18% after the 2008 financial 
crisis. Therefore the brutal increase in unemployment rates could explain the timing of the 
protests. However, unemployment does not account for the fact that countries such as 
Ireland, France, Denmark, and several eastern European countries, which have seen soaring 
unemployment rates, were not involved in the massive protests. Leaving aside the question 
of “when,” let us try to examine more specifically the question of “who.” 
 
 
9 More surprisingly, during the summer of 2011 in the UK, riots exploded involving native-born poor British 
and immigrant youths from Africa, the West Indies and Central Asia. This was similar to France in 2005-2006, 
when violent clashes erupted among students protesting fee hikes and poor youth intervened. Violence and 
division between different youth segments gave these events a different character from the Indignados protests in 
Southern European countries. 
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Table 1: Youth (15–24) unemployment rates in main regions of the world during early 2000s. 
 2000  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU and developed 
countries 
13.5%  12.5% 13.3% 17.3% 18.1% 18.0% 
Middle East 24.0%  24.8% 25.7% 25.2% 25.4% 26.5% 
North Africa 28.7%  23.8% 23.0% 23.6% 23.1% 27.9% 
World 12.7%  11.6% 11.7% 12.6% 12.7% 12.6% 
Source: ILO and World Bank Statistics, 2012. 
More specific characteristics of unemployment must be taken into account. During 
recent decades, rising oil prices facilitated generous welfare services (education, health, 
housing) and elevated revenues for a fraction of the middle classes. But in many MENA 
countries, the number of qualified jobs provided domestically was insufficient and a 
significant portion of educated youth resorted to exile in foreign countries.  
Unlike most northern regions of the world, unemployment rates in the MENA region are 
highest amongst the educated youth.10 Several ILO reports have cited this. For instance, in 
Morocco the unemployment rate for educated urban youth is over 1.5 times the uneducated 
rate (64% vs. 40% in 2005) and three times higher in rural settings (34% vs. 11%).11 To 
check the unemployment nexus more systematically, we plotted the unemployment ratio 
(tertiary educated youth vs. primary educated youth on the vertical axis) against the 
unemployment rate (maximum male/female under 25 on the horizontal axis). The two 
conditions—a youth unemployment rate over 30% and a ratio of tertiary educated 
unemployed youth to primary educated unemployed above 2.0—broadly point to those 
MENA countries that faced massive protests, with one conspicuous exception (Saudi Arabia) 
and one less conspicuous exception (Algeria), considering these criteria (see Figure 3, north-
east quadrant).  
10 “This situation is typical in countries where education and training systems are not adequately linked to 
the skills required by the economy, including its most promising growth sectors. Graduates, misinformed about 
the country’s working conditions and requirements, may have educational profiles that are inconsistent with 
reality. This makes it difficult to enter the labor market. Based on a survey of 1,500 youth and 1,500 employers in 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, a report by the International Finance Corporation and the 
Islamic Development Bank shows that the skills and knowledge taught in Arab schools often have little or no 
connection to labor market needs.” (http://www.makingitmagazine.net/?p=6094). 
11 See B. Boudarbat, A. Ajbilou, Youth Exclusion in Morocco: Context, Consequences, and Policies, 2007. 
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In Europe, the same combination of unemployment variables points to the countries 
that experienced widespread protests in 2011 (i.e. the Indignados, or outraged, movements). 
One part-exception is Italy, which has experienced political turmoil beyond the massive 2011 
demonstrations. While high unemployment of educated youth was less common in Europe 
as a whole, it was distinctively seen in Southern Europe. In 2000, the unemployment rates in 
both Greece and Spain were almost identical for educated and uneducated youth. While the 
unemployment rate for uneducated youth has increased faster over the last 10 years, 
especially in Spain, the ratio of educated unemployed to uneducated unemployed remains 
high. In contrast, in most Northern and Eastern European countries, the educated 
unemployment level oscillates between one-third and one-fifth of the uneducated level. In 
those countries, education protects against unemployment. Moreover, in several Northern 
countries—the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany—overall low unemployment rates may 
have prevented the protests (Appendix, Table a1). 
The data represented in Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the role of the unemployment 
ratio between educated and uneducated youth in association with the overall youth 
unemployment rate plays a central role in the protests. If we want to capture the specific 
frustrations of educated people, we might consider as a direct incentive of the 
demonstrations the relative percentage of unemployed educated youth compared to 
uneducated youth12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 We could also consider the cross product of youth unemployment by this ratio. However, the product of 
average youth unemployment multiplied by the percentage of educated youth could be very different from the 
percentage unemployed with different level of education, because in many MENA countries high unemployment 
rates are specific to educated youth. 
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Figure 3: MENA 2007–2010: unemployment ratio of tertiary educated vs. primary according to 
unemployment rate (maximum male/female <25 years) 
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Figure 4: Europe 2010: unemployment ratio of tertiary educated vs. primary according to 
unemployment rate (maximum male/female <25 years) 
 
 
We have summarized the interplay of these variables in regressions, taking as an 
outcome the massive unrest and demonstration in 2011. Most accounts of the Arab Springs 
involve Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. In addition, we built an alternative 
analysis that includes Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the list of countries affected by protests. 
By the same token, we have in a variant added Italy to the core of those Southern European 
countries (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) involved in the Indignados movements. In every 
models, the contribution of the unemployment ratio between tertiary educated and primary 
educated is fairly significant. Conversely, the percentage of the youth population of working 
age is not a statistically significant determinant of protests except in one of the analyses. In 
Models 2 and 2b, high youth unemployment rates contribute significantly to the protests. In 
order to take into account the different situation of women and men, we have introduced 
gender specific unemployment rates in Europe and MENA (analysis not presented). As we 
have seen, a salient aspect of the modernization process is the increasing size of the 
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educated population. One of the hypotheses linked to educated youth involvement in 
demonstrations leads us to take into account the size of the population that could claim 
qualified jobs.  
Table 2: Europe and MENA countries in 2011. Outcome: occurrence of massive protest movements and/or 
revolution (robust probit models, coef.) 
 protests 1 protests 2 protests 2b protests 4 protests 5 
 Coef se Coef se coef se Coef se Coef se 
15–24 y.o. 
as % of 15–64 y.o. 0.01 0.07 -0.19 0.11 -0.25** 0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.07 
Youth unemployment 
rate 
2008–2010 
(max. men/women) 
0.09* 0.04 0.26*** 0.07   0.04 0.03 0.10* 0.05 
Europe* 
Unemployment ratio 
tertiary vs. primary 
8.86** 3.09 16.77*** 3.97   4.45* 2.07 12.62*** 2.95 
MENA*Unemployment 
ratio tertiary vs. primary 0.98** 0.35 2.99*** 0.71   0.90** 0.34 1.17** 0.39 
MENA: Youth 
unemployment rate 
2008–2010 
    0.14* 0.06     
Europe: Youth 
unemployment rate 
2008–2010 
    0.18*** 0.05     
Unemployment ratio 
tertiary vs. primary     1.89*** 0.55     
Constant -7.64** 2.55 13.50*** 2.90 -2.70 .86 -2.89 1.61 -9.15*** 2.64 
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.84 0.71 0.47 0.69 
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 42 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
List of protest countries taken in account in the different models 1, 2, 3, 4. 
1: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
2: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
3: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
4: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 
In northern and eastern European countries there was no youth unity because the 
unemployment rate among educated youth was much lower than among uneducated youth,; 
indeed, violent fights broke out between educated and uneducated youth in 2010 and 2011 
in France and the UK. After the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment levels soared. In 
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Southern European countries, during the early 2000s and even up to the 2010s, the 
unemployment rates of educated youth remained closer to the uneducated ones, counting for 
at least half the unemployment rate of non-graduates. In Northern and Eastern countries, the 
tertiary educated unemployment rate was about one-fifth of youth with only a primary 
education level (Appendix, Table a1). n this respect youth of different backgrounds shared in 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, a common fate; both the educated and uneducated alike found 
themselves in a bad position. This could explain their involvement in the Indignados 
movements in Spain, their even stronger involvement in Greece and also in Portugal, all of 
which were countries strongly affected of the financial crisis. From a socio-economic 
viewpoint, Italy should also have taken part in the Southern European protests, as shown by 
equation 4, table 2. Political insurgency did eventually take place in Italy, but no massive 
demonstrations occurred. The case of Ireland, remains different despite rising unemployment 
levels because the high unemployment rates did not greatly affect the educated. Moreover, 
with the Western recession, there were fewer possibilities of finding well-paying jobs abroad. 
Educated youth facing unemployment were in a situation of double foreclosure on their 
prospects.  
Following suggestions from Campante and Chor (2012), I have taken into account the 
changes in the percentages of 15–24 year-olds with secondary or tertiary educations 
between 1980 and 2010 (Table 3). I have tested the cross product of youth unemployment 
rates and percentages of youth with secondary or tertiary education, and the product of youth 
unemployment rates by the increases in percentages of educated youth, across recent 
decades. In these models, the percentages of unemployed youth under 25 years old have 
also been included.  
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Table 3: Europe and MENA countries in 2011. Outcome: occurrence of massive protest movements or 
revolution (robust probit models. coef.) 
 protest_cs1 protest_cs2 protest_cs3 protest_cs4 
 coef Se coef se coef se coef se 
15–24 y.o. as % of 15–64 y.o. -0.05 0.07       
Youth <25 y.o. unemployment rate 
2008–2010 (max. men/women) 0.20** 0.08 0.18* 0.07     
Increase in secondary or tertiary 
education (completed) 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Youth (15–24) unemployment rate 
* Increase in secondary or tertiary 
education 
-0.35 0.22 -0.33 0.21 -0.24 0.17 -0.24 0.17 
MENA countries * Female <25 y.o. 
unemployment rate 2008–2010     0.15** 0.06   
European countries* Female <25 
y.o. unemployment rate 2008–2010     0.16* 0.07   
Female <25 y.o. unemployment 
rate 2008–2010       0.15** 0.06 
MENA countries dummy 0.59 0.95 -0.02 0.62   -0.13 0.66 
Constant -6.66* 3.05 -7.15** 2.53 -5.93** 2.21 -5.73** 1.90 
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.43 
Number of observations 40 40 40 40 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
List of protest countries taken in account in the different models cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4. 
1: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
2: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
3: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
4: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 
Campante and Chor, using these variables on a larger set of countries and a slightly 
different outcome, have proposed an interpretation focusing on the opportunity costs of 
participating in demonstrations. For them, youth who have completed secondary or tertiary 
education can better assume the opportunity cost of spending time in demonstrations and 
political activism than poorly educated youth. But because there are no jobs, this opportunity 
cost vanishes and thus explains the involvement in protests of educated youth in many 
MENA countries. They write, “In our interpretation, individuals would be more prone to 
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devote their energies to political protest not only because they are aggrieved, but also 
because it is less costly to do so when  labor market conditions are weak. […] The weak  
labor market conditions lower the opportunity cost of political activity more for the highly 
educated than the less educated (whose time is less valued by the  labor market regardless 
of broader economic circumstances) and more for effort-intensive activities than for less 
intensive ones.” Regressions made on our set of countries, following Campante and Chor’s 
suggestion, show that the increase in education levels is loosely connected to a higher 
probability of protest (Table 3, all models, line 3). The interaction variable capturing the 
opportunity cost effect, defined by the product of education increase from 1980 to 2010 with 
youth unemployment in 2010, is negative and does not reach significant levels (Table 3, line 
four).13 It could reflect the fact that Western countries where these percentages are highest 
were not greatly affected by the protests.14  
Even if one accepts that the increase in education, considered by the authors as an 
opportunity cost, has a positive effect on protest occurrence, it could be interpreted as an 
expression of the relative frustration of educated youth facing bleak economic prospects.15 A 
rational choice hypothesis seems too narrow a perspective and, moreover, does not agree 
with the data. 
Gender gap 
Multivariate analysis shows female unemployment in MENA countries has contributed 
to unrest. Analysis presented in the Appendix shows that female unemployment rates are 
significant, specifically in MENA countries (Table a2). For instance, in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Yemen, despite the restrictions and threats against protesting women, many observers have 
seen that women were very active and present in 2011. However, unemployment rates are 
not the best measure of women’s relative exclusion from economic activities. Rough 
estimates suggest that, on average, with 75% of women outside the labor market (neither 
employed nor unemployed) in Middle Eastern countries and 72% in northern Africa countries, 
this is the region of the world where women are the most excluded from paid activity (the 
world mean is 50%). In Northern Mediterranean countries, women’s overall activity rates are 
higher, primarily as a result of higher female participation in the labor market. “In Turkey, 
13 This interaction, chosen by Campante and Chor (2012) to verify their hypothesis, does not capture the 2010 
unemployment rate of those who have completed secondary or tertiary school curricula, which is a sensitive point 
(the product could be high with a low unemployment rate for qualified youth). 
14 In the models presented in their paper (Campante and Chor, 2012), including a wide set of non-Mena countries 
outside Europe, the positive effect of education increase*unemployment is balanced by a negative effect of the 
increase in education. It is possible that there is a trade-off effect. 
15 There is no political outlet for these new educated elite. As Marxists used to say, educated youth have nothing 
to lose. This is not exactly a weak opportunity cost. 
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Malta and Italy, for example, where female activity rates are also low, the overall rate of 
participation in the labor market still stands at 52 per cent, 60 per cent and 62 per cent 
respectively.”16 Besides that, “of the 8.5 million unemployed, some 3.5 million (about 41 per 
cent) are women.”17 It is noteworthy that female unemployment levels were lower in oil 
producing countries (10% in Bahrain, 2002; 2–3% in Qatar, 2002–2010, but 13% in 2001; 3–
10% in the U.A.E., 2000–2009; 10–13% in Saudi Arabia) than in non-producing countries (2–
3% in Yemen before 2001, 39–45% after 2004; Oman is in between Yemen 17% and the 
other Gulf countries). 
Low female participation rates combined with high female unemployment mean that 
only a small number of women (one in seven) are actually gainfully employed in the 
economy. While women’s education is improving, they still struggle to find adequate 
employment, and there are undoubtedly strong barriers in place that prevent the economy 
and the labor market from adequately allocating human resources. This may have been an 
incentive for young women to take to the streets in MENA countries (Table a2 shows 
multivariate analysis supporting this interpretation). By contrast, in northern European 
countries, unemployment decreases with higher levels of education for both men and 
women.  
Political context and legitimacy  
A High rate of unemployment among educated youth does not automatically translates 
to turmoil. More than in Europe, where youth educated unemployment soared after the 
financial crisis, the question of “when” remains in MENA countries and is not addressed by 
socio-economics changes. These deep demographic and social changes in the Middle East 
and North Africa provided only a potential basis for turmoil, but educated youth, even more 
than their European counterparts were deprived of avenues in the political arena. The 
foreclosure on the future may have been determinant for massive demonstrations. The 
success of demonstrations, sit-ins and occupations of public squares also depends on the 
silent approval of wider strata of the society, the inhibition or partial inhibition of the 
repression, and a dwindling confidence in ruling authorities.  
It is far beyond the ambition of this paper to characterize the social and political 
dynamics in northern European and MENA countries. The political situation of the MENA 
region underwent crucial transformations following the nationalist revolutions of the 1950s 
16 Integrated social policy: labor Markets and labor Market Policy in the UN-ESCWA Region, UN-ESCWA, Report 
IV, 2012; p. 4. 
17 Abide, p. 9. 
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and 1960s. These revolutions inaugurated authoritarian and/or military regimes—Nasser in 
Egypt, the Baath party in Syria and Iraq, the FLN in Algeria, Gaddafi in Libya, and several 
different leaders in Yemen. In those places, Shiites are often excluded from power as well as 
from economic achievement. In several cases, the ruling elite, which came to power by way 
of a secularist party, has built a patrimonial state. The secularized ruling elite funneled 
access to wealth and resources to a narrow circle of clients.18 If the ruling families in Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and other Gulf states found some measure of legitimacy, supported by 
petrodollars currencies , by consolidating a patrimonial state, legitimacy was much more 
difficult to attain for the secularized elite in countries lacking petrol, for reasons including 
unfair elections, the absence of independent justice, and lack of free press. But up until the 
early 2000s, an inescapable deadlock remained at the political level throughout the MENA 
countries. In contrast with Europe, the autocrats in MENA countries, and their families and 
clients, stayed in power for decades through intense coercion.  
If I had to summarize the socio-political conditions during the 2011 wave of protests, I 
would consider the suspension of legitimacy of the ruling authorities. When those who are 
ruling are no longer legitimated to do so, there is a breach that demonstrators can use. Often 
there is a fraction of motivated actors, whose claims are supported by wider strata of the 
population. The notion of the suspension of legitimacy (which could be said both for legal 
governments as for dictators) is wide and somewhat vague. The idea is that legitimacy is 
suspended or weakened when large strata of the population consider that the rulers have 
failed in their primary mission, namely the provision of basic goods. The suspension of 
legitimacy encompasses a two-part process. First, situations occur in which rulers, who in 
many cases were not elected, no longer have the aura that surrounded them when they 
deposed the previous authority (i.e. kings ?; e.g. Gaddafi in 1969). Second, this suspension 
of legitimacy is linked to the inability of these rulers to ensure that the basic needs of the 
population at large are met. Let us begin with the latter. 
Food revolts? 
While globalization causes homogeneity in many domains, discontinuities and 
heterogeneity remain in others. ?. Food riots occurred in Europe in the middle of the 19th 
century, following periods of drought and food scarcity (they are at the root of the 1848 
revolutionary process). Regarding this basic good, the countries south of the Mediterranean 
do not face the same challenges. Today a paper entitled Food Crisis and Political Instability 
18 The Trabelsi/Ben Ali family in Tunisia, the Al-Assad family in Syria, and the Moubarak family in Egypt were 
autocrats and gathered in private hands a significant part of their country’s resources. 
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in Africa and the Middle East by Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011) includes a figure 
showing a food price curve that is so precisely related to the timing of the unrest that it 
seems difficult to discard the argument or even consider others factors such as demographic 
bulge and youth unemployment, which do not have such a precise temporal connection with 
the wave of unrest as to be pertinent in explaining the protests. Authors state that “the timing 
of violent protests in MENA in 2011, as well as earlier riots in 2008, coincide with large peaks 
in global food prices. […] These observations suggest that protest may reflect not only long 
standing political failings of governments, but also the sudden desperate straits of desperate 
population.” Today many countries rely on the global food supply system and are thus 
sensitive to global food prices. The synchronization of events is, from this viewpoint, the 
consequence of price volatility (caused by intense speculation) and a dependence on 
imported food products in the absence of good governance. The authors write that the 
inability of governments to protect the population from hunger is the starting point of the 
collapse of their legitimacy. One must be sensitive to the importance given to the suffering 
indicated by this price curve; beyond the steep index lie hungry people. During the 1990s, 
social movements were reduced to nothing in Tunisia and Libya, and were fragmented in 
Egypt. The lowest strata of the population were recurrently involved in what L. Sadiki has 
called “riots of the belly” (khubz). In the case of MENA upheavals, food prices seem to have 
been of great concern in Egypt. In Tunisia, demonstrations started in neglected rural areas 
where the union movement was strong and spiraled toward the capital.  
At this point in their argument, the authors make a big leap. It is easy to understand 
how food price hikes could both foster anger against authorities and provide an incentive for 
taking to the street. However, the way anger delegitimizes a ruler may be modified by many 
specific factors. If we were to adhere to such an argument, it remains to be explained why 
certain countries in the MENA region have seen widespread demonstrations and not others. 
Among the many grounds for action cited by the educated youth who have taken to the street 
and occupied the central squares, hunger in its literal meaning has not been a major 
motivation. Thus, it is necessary to combine that argument with the motivations of the youth 
and the illegitimacy of the rulers.  
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Food price index, 1990–2014: nominal and deflated 
Source: FAO, 2013, base 2000–2004=100 
The collapse of the legitimacy of public authorities often allows motivated actors to gain 
momentum. South of the Mediterranean, the construction of an alliance between educated 
youth and large fraction of the population may have been facilitated by the inability of the 
rulers to provide basic goods (affordable food, oil). If food hikes contributed to the socio-
political context of these surges of unrest, they are also characterized by the exhaustion of 
patronage arrangements that developed in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Army, corruption and dictatorship  
In Tunisia, the army, which did not control the domestic economy, refused to support 
Ben Ali’s regime in the early days following Bouazizi’s death. In Egypt, the army, which was 
deeply involved in the domestic economy and the public sector, clearly corrupted the rent 
economy at all levels, therefore was adverse to economic liberalization and aimed to 
maintain its influence on private sector growth through real estate implications. However the 
army quickly decided to abandon Mubarak as a measure of self-preservation. Like the police, 
the army is a feared power in Egypt. There is widespread distrust between the police and the 
people. However, its neutral position, when Mubarak was ousted, was never seen as support 
for the demonstrators, as was the case in Tunisia. In Syria, the army was not very supportive 
during the early days of the civil strife and, despite the defection of several prestigious 
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officers, it remained largely supportive of Al-Assad’s regime. In Yemen, Ali Saleh never lost 
the army’s full support but there was a split in allegiance between different factions. 
Corruption is present everywhere in varying spectrum, even among dictatorships. There are 
many shades between the Trabelsi/Ben Ali family and Mubarak, and Gaddafi, the latter 
prohibited private ownership and retail trade, banned a free press and subverted civil service, 
replacing the state by kin networks of clients. One would be right in asking if such a thing as 
a Libyan society even existed before 2011. In Tunisia, according to Wiki-leaks, more than 
half the Tunisian business elite were linked to the Trabelsi/Ben Ali family19. However, it is 
fairly difficult to systematically take into account the corruption process because international 
indices are of unreliable. 
 
 Figure 5: MENA 2010–11: protests and political change based on percentage of youth 
among total working age population 
 
The erosion of legitimacy over time is obviously not the same in Morocco and Libya 
since the establishment processes and the nature of the political regimes there are very 
different. However, they shared one general aspect: the longevity? in power. As can be seen 
19 Anderson, 2011. 
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in Figure 5, the incumbent’s duration of power is closely associated with the development of 
protests in MENA countries. The length of the incumbent’s time in office is a good indicator 
for unrest but there are exceptions among some MENA countries. The Arab Spring uprisings 
neither fully engulfed Jordan nor entirely passed it by. Frustration in Jordan began bubbling 
up in 2010, and the following year a series of protests of modest size, but not modest 
significance, brought together a wide-ranging group: East Bankers, citizens of Palestinian 
origin, Islamists, and unaffiliated youth. Those who took to the streets had a variety of 
grievances, “but at their core they were expressing anger with the state of the economy, 
ostentatious corruption, unaccountability and the concentration of power in the hands of the 
few.”20 The situation in Saudi Arabia should also have elicited protests. However, three 
interrelated factors seem to have repressed the movement: oil wealth, powerful coercion 
and, to a lesser extent, the legitimacy of the Saud. But, for how much longer? “The al-Saud 
must fear that future democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt and other 
Arab countries, coupled with articulated Islamic reasoning in support of democratic 
representative governance in Islam, will pressure Riyadh’s absolute monarchy to become 
representative and participatory, let alone a republic.”21 This also seems to be the case in 
Iran. One may ask whether the many battles fought by Iranian youth against the clerics’ 
authoritarian hierarchy, specifically in 2009 after the elections because of the lack of 
transparency in the electoral process/results and the denial of Amir Moussavi’s victory, might 
be termed an Arab Spring movement. 
 Meritocracy and its discontents  
There is no parallel in Europe in this respect. The weakening legitimacy north of the 
Mediterranean cannot be easily captured using the same observations. North of the 
Mediterranean, those countries with Indignados movements did experience dictatorships: the 
Regime of the Colonels in Greece from 1967 to 1974, Franco in Spain from 1939 to 1975, 
and Salazar in Portugal from 1928 to 1974; but not now. Thus, the return to democracy could 
not be seen as a central objective of the 2011 movements as it was with the Arab Spring 
movements. Moreover, the left was already in power in all three countries: the Pasok party 
under Papandreou in Greece, Gonzalez and Zapatero in Spain, and Soares in Portugal. 
20 In the past, it was relatively easy for the monarchy to play the card that has come to define the 
Jordanian polity and that separates East Bankers from Palestinian Jordanians. The former believe they are the 
country’s legitimate inhabitants and fear usurpation of their traditional dominance by the more numerous citizens 
of Palestinian origin. Their support for the monarchy has been linked in part to their over-representation in the 
public sector, the security services and parliament (through gerrymandered electoral districting). Conversely, 
Palestinian Jordanians have felt marginalized, shut out from key state positions and at times treated as disloyal; 
the memory of the bloody 1970 civil war in which Palestinian groups were defeated by regime forces also informs 
their perception of central authorities and contributes to a lingering sense of exclusion. 
21 Elhadj, 2012. 
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The basic good provided in European countries by governments is no longer the 
protection against hunger, which is systematically warranted. Nevertheless, when the 
minimum expectations of employment and the ability to earn an income are difficult to 
achieve, the deterioration of legitimacy extends to the whole political spectrum. The 
exclusion from paid activity of those who are compliant with the terms of the implicit social 
contract (i.e. those who have diplomas) is a major breach of that contract and is seen as a 
sign that the authorities’ legitimacy is greatly weakened. If it exists, the ordinary functioning of 
the democracy gives people the means by which to say no; however, it sometimes does not 
ensure social stability because the political system as a whole seems unable to take into 
account major stakes and basic grievances. Because political channels through party 
mobilization and elections seem to fail to fulfill these basic aspirations in some European 
countries, this could also entail a suspension of legitimacy, at least in part. In 2011, this 
suspension stemmed from what we may call the broken promises of meritocracy. Drawing on 
the correlation between the level of education and the places occupied in society, 
meritocracy proclaims the worth of academic success against inheritance. In Northern and 
Eastern Europe, with three to five times lower unemployment rates than young people with 
no diploma or only basic schooling, graduates are significantly better off on the labor market. 
In addition, the careers open to them are more interesting and symbolically more rewarding. 
The low unemployment rates based on the level of education common to Northern and 
Eastern European countries, which did not disappear during the financial crisis, have 
contributed to support the legitimacy of the meritocratic ideal. However, in southern Europe, 
the educated youth have shared the fate of the least educated despite their education and 
thus no longer believe in meritocracy. A large percentage of them are disillusioned and 
outraged over the failure of the meritocratic promise. The fact that only the interaction 
between unemployment and education levels, not unemployment itself, is statistically 
significant, points in the direction of a relative frustration.  
Those elements are motivational arguments. Beyond that, the main issue is the 
capacity of educated youth to build an alliance that is able to define a social hegemony 
beyond its own interests. Even though Southern European countries mostly caught up with 
Northern European countries in terms of living standards during the last quarter of the 20th 
century, the average southern European worker is still less protected by work contracts than 
northern European workers. Thus, when unemployment climbed to high levels in the late 
2000s, the deep differences in societal responses to this challenge contributed to dividing 
European countries.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure a1: People using internet and mobile subscription per 100 in 2010 
 
    Source: ITU estimates 
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  Table a1: Europe: % of 15–24 youth unemployed by educational level 
 2000  2010 
 primary tertiary   primary tertiary 
Austria    8.8 2.4 
Belgium 10.3 2.7  15.3 4.5 
Czech Rep 22.6 3  25 2.8 
Denmark 6.2 2.6  10.7 4.9 
Finland 18.7 5.2  16.1 4.4 
France 15.3 5.5  15.4 5.5 
Germany 12.6 4.3  14.9 3.1 
Greece 9.2 8.1  12.5 9.8 
Hungary 11.5 1.4  24.9 4.7 
Ireland 7.9 1.7  21.1 7.5 
Italy 12.1 6  10.3 5.7 
Netherlands 4.4 1.7  7.2 2.8 
Norway 6.6 2.5  7.3 1.8 
Poland 21.8 5.5  17.6 5 
Portugal 3.9 2.8  11.8 7.2 
Slovakia 40.4 5.3  44.2 5.8 
Spain 15.2 10.9  27.3 11.3 
Sweden 8.1 3  17.6 4.5 
UK 8.8 2.5  13.7 4.1 
             Source: ILO 2011. 
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Table a2: Supplementary regressions (probit models): outcome protests, with distinct female 
unemployment rate 
  protest 1c protest 2d 
  coef se coef se 
Europe*Female 
unemployment rate 2008–2010 
0,09 0,05 0,18* 0,07 
MENA*Female 
unemployment rate 2008–2010 
0,08* 0,04 0,14* 0,05 
Europe*Unemployment ratio 
tertiary vs. primary 
7,71** 2,89 11,93*** 3,53 
MENA*Unemployment ratio 
tertiary vs. primary 
0,96* 0,44 1,98*** 0,53 
_cons -6,72*** 1,85 -11,51*** 2,79 
Pseudo R2 0,622 0,790 
Number of observations 42 42 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Protest countries : 
1: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
               2: Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen; Greece, Portugal, Spain 
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